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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
John R. Walk *
Andrew P. Sherrod **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys recent significant developments in Virginia
civil practice and procedure. Specifically, the article discusses
opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia from June 2009
through April 2010 addressing civil procedure; significant amend-
ments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia made during
the same period; and legislation enacted by the Virginia General
Assembly during its 2010 session relating to civil practice.
II. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Expert Testimony
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently decided several cases
addressing matters of expert testimony.' In Hollingsworth v. Nor-
folk Southern Railway Co., the court held that podiatrists are not
qualified to provide expert opinions on the cause of physical in-
jury.2 In Hollingsworth, a case brought under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act,3 a railroad employee alleged that his job re-
quired him to walk on large ballast set on the bed of the railroad
track and that this caused injury to his feet and ankles. 4 In sup-
* Shareholder, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1980, University
of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 1977, College of William & Mary. Mr. Walk is an Ad-
junct Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law.
** Principal, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2000, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law; B.A., 1996, Hampden-Sydney College.
1. See Boyce v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 644, 691 S.E.2d 782 (2010); Lawrence v.
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 490, 689 S.E.2d 748 (2010); Hollingsworth v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
279 Va. 360, 689 S.E.2d 651 (2010); Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 682 S.E.2d 535 (2009).
2. Hollingsworth, 279 Va. at 368-69, 689 S.E.2d at 656.
3. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006).
4. Hollingsworth, 279 Va. at 363, 689 S.E.2d at 652. "Ballast is rock laid on the
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port of his cause, the plaintiff employee identified two licensed
podiatrists as his expert witnesses.' The podiatrists were desig-
nated to testify that they had treated the plaintiff for a foot condi-
tion and that the injuries they treated were caused by his walk-
ing on irregular surfaces such as the railroad ballast.6
In response to the plaintiffs expert designation, the railroad
filed motions in limine to exclude the podiatrists because they
were not medical doctors and therefore could not opine as to the
cause of the plaintiffs alleged foot injuries.7 The trial court
granted the motions and subsequently granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the railroad on the grounds that the plaintiff
could not prove his case, because the time for designating experts
had passed and he did not have a witness to testify as to the
cause of his injuries., In affirming the trial court's decision, the
court noted that it has "repeatedly held that only a medical doctor
is qualified to testify about the cause of a human physical in-
jury." The court also pointed out the distinction drawn by the
General Assembly between the practice of medicine and the prac-
tice of podiatry.,o According to the language of Virginia Code sec-
tion 54.1-2900 in effect at the time of the court's decision, the
practice of medicine is defined as "the prevention, diagnosis and
treatment of human physical or mental ailments, conditions, dis-
eases, pain or infirmities by any means or method," whereas the
practice of podiatry is defined as "the medical, mechanical and
surgical treatment of the ailments of the human foot and ankle.""
In light of these statutory definitions, the court found that "while
both medical doctors and podiatrists may engage in the treatment
of a physical injury to the human foot and ankle, only a medical
doctor may engage in the diagnosis of that injury so as to qualify
to render an expert opinion regarding the causation of that in-
roadbed at a railroad track for the purpose of providing foundation and facilitating drai-
nage." Id. at 363 n.1, 689 S.E.2d at 652 n.1 (citation omitted).
5. Id. at 363, 689 S.E.2d at 652.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id., 689 S.E.2d at 652-53.
9. Id. at 364, 369, 689 S.E.2d at 653, 656.
10. Id. at 366, 689 S.E.2d at 654.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900 (Repl. Vol. 2009). As discussed infra, the statutory de-
finition of the practice of podiatry was subsequently amended to eliminate the distinction
cited by the court. See Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 725, 2010 Va. Acts _ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900) (Supp. 2010)).
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jury."12 As a result, the court upheld the exclusion of the
podiatrists from testifying as to the cause of the plaintiffs inju-
ries.13 In response to Hollingsworth, the 2010 General Assembly
passed legislation to add "diagnosis" to the definition of the prac-
tice of podiatry.1 Thus, the Hollingsworth result has been effec-
tively abrogated by statute.
In two cases arising out of civil commitment proceedings under
the Sexually Violent Predator Act,1 the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia addressed the ability of an expert witness to testify on the ba-
sis of hearsay. In Lawrence v. Commonwealth, the Common-
wealth presented testimony from a licensed clinical psychologist
that included details from police reports about certain unadjudi-
cated allegations of sexual misconduct on the part of the defen-
dant, and the defendant objected on the grounds that the infor-
mation was hearsay and that any probative value was
outweighed by undue prejudice.16 The defendant also objected to
the psychologist's written psychological evaluation on the ground
that it was based on the police reports containing unadjudicated
allegations of misconduct." In response, the Commonwealth con-
tended that expert witnesses are allowed to rely upon hearsay
under Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1 and that, in any event, the
statements regarding the information contained in the police re-
port were not being offered for their truth but to show the basis
for the expert's opinion.', The trial court overruled the defen-
dant's objections to the expert's testimony but did give the jury
the following limiting instruction: "Testimony regarding allega-
tions of behavior contained in police reports for which the Res-
pondent has not been convicted was not offered or is not offered to
12. Hollingsworth, 279 Va. at 366, 689 S.E.2d at 654.
13. Id. at 368-69, 689 S.E.2d at 656.
14. See ch. 725, 2010 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900
(Supp. 2010)).
15. §§ 37.2-900 to -920 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
16. 279 Va. 490, 493-94, 689 S.E.2d 748, 750 (2010).
17. Id. at 494, 689 S.E.2d at 750.
18. Id. Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1 states as follows in relevant part:
In any civil action any expert witness may give testimony and render an opi-
nion or draw inferences from facts, circumstances or data made known to or
perceived by such witness at or before the hearing or trial during which he is
called upon to testify. The facts, circumstances or data relied upon by such
witness in forming an opinion or drawing inferences, if of a type normally re-
lied upon by others in the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and
drawing inferences, need not be admissible in evidence.
§ 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
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prove that the behavior actually occurred, but only as the basis
for the expert's opinion."l9 The supreme court reversed, ruling
that the psychologist's testimony "did not have an adequate fac-
tual foundation to the extent it was dependent upon assuming the
truth of the hearsay allegations concerning [the defendant's] past
sexual misconduct."0 According to the court, because of the de-
pendence upon the truth of the hearsay statements regarding the
defendant's past, the expert's opinions "were speculative and un-
reliable as a matter of law."21
In the subsequent decision of Boyce v. Commonwealth, howev-
er, the supreme court upheld the opinion testimony of a mental
health expert based in part on a criminal charge of taking inde-
cent liberties with a child that had been dismissed by nolle prose-
qui.22 The witness explained that his opinion that the defendant
met the criteria of a sexually violent predator was based on the
"totality of the evidence ... includ[ing] a review of Boyce's crimi-
nal history, convictions as well as dismissed charges for sexual of-
fenses, an interview with Boyce, and various risk assessments."21
In distinguishing Lawrence, the court stated that the mental
health professional in question "did not base his opinion on the
inference that Boyce committed the offense dismissed by nolle
prosequi."24
In Graham v. Cook, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
the admissibility of certain testimony provided by a plaintiffs
treating physicians in a medical malpractice case.2 6 The plaintiff
in Graham underwent surgery to repair a fractured hip, which
entailed the installation of a reconstruction plate secured by sev-
eral screws. 26 Following the surgery, the plaintiff continued to suf-
fer pain in his hip and returned to his physician for follow-up
treatment and X-rays. 27 The plaintiff later sued for medical mal-
practice.28 A fundamental issue for the medical malpractice claim
19. Lawrence, 279 Va. at 494, 689 S.E.2d at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. at 499, 689 S.E.2d at 753.
21. Id.
22. 279 Va. 647, 651, 691 S.E.2d 782, 783-84, 786 (2010).
23. Id. at 647-48, 691 S.E.2d at 786.
24. Id. at 651, 691 S.E.2d at 786.
25. 278 Va. 233, 237, 682 S.E.2d 535, 537 (2009).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 238, 682 S.E.2d at 537.
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was whether the plaintiffs condition was caused by one of the
screws that had been inserted during the surgery or by a condi-
tion known as avascular necrosis (bone death due to lack of blood
supply) unrelated to the screws."
In support of his defense that it was avascular necrosis and not
the screws inserted that caused the plaintiffs alleged injuries, the
defendant physician introduced deposition testimony from certain
other physicians who had treated the plaintiff.30 Testimony from
two of the plaintiffs treating radiologists, who read from their
written reports, included statements that (1) "[t]he possibility of
avascular necrosis is not excluded," (2) "avascular necrosis cannot
be excluded," (3) "[the b]ony defect now seen involving the ante-
rior aspect of the femoral head [is] associated with . .. deminera-
lization suggesting fracture and avascular necrosis," and (4)
"[t]his raises the suspicion for avascular necrosis."', The plaintiff
objected to these statements, contending that avascular necrosis
is a medical diagnosis and the radiologists had not testified to
this condition with the requisite reasonable degree of medical
probability required by Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B).32 In
upholding the trial court's admission of the radiologists' testimo-
ny, the supreme court concluded that the doctors had not testified
as to a diagnosis but instead had given testimony that was "fac-
tual in nature and related the physicians' impressions and con-
clusions formed when treating" the plaintiff.33 According to the
court, the statements were not diagnoses "because the statements
did not purport to identify specifically the cause of [the plaintiffs]
health condition based on his signs and symptoms."34
The defendant also submitted the deposition testimony of a
surgeon who had performed a procedure on the plaintiffs hip,
who testified among other things that "he 'did not see any goug-
ing of the femoral head from any hardware,' and that [the plain-
tiffl 'clearly had Stage III avascular necrosis as his major prob-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 238-39, 682 S.E.2d at 537-38.
31. Id. at 239-40, 682 S.E.2d at 538 (emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 239, 682 S.E.2d at 538. Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B) states as follows:
"Only diagnosis offered to a reasonable degree of medical probability shall be admissible at
trial." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
33. Graham, 278 Va. at 244, 682 S.E.2d at 541.
34. Id. at 245, 682 S.E.2d at 541.
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lem."'3 5 The plaintiff again challenged the introduction of both
statements as expressing expert medical opinions that were not
stated within a reasonable degree of medical probability.36 As to
the first statement, the supreme court again ruled that the doc-
tor's testimony was essentially factual and based on his own ob-
servations during treatment, and not a diagnosis that needed to
comply with Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B).37 As to the second
statement, however, the court concluded that the doctor had
stated a diagnosis, so the issue was whether the diagnosis had
been made with a reasonable degree of medical probability.38 In
upholding the admission of the diagnosis, the court pointed to an
opening colloquy of defendant's counsel during the deposition in
which the witness was instructed that "some of my questions may
or may not require medical opinion, and if your answer does in-
clude medical opinion, I would ask you only give such opinion if
you hold it within a reasonable degree of medical probability.""9
Although the plaintiff contended that this "prefatory exchange"
failed to provide a sufficient foundation to admit the doctor's di-
agnosis, the supreme court noted that plaintiffs counsel failed to
object to the form of the questions eliciting the diagnosis at the
time of the deposition and ruled that the plaintiff therefore lost
the opportunity to raise those objections at trial according to Rule
4:7(d)(3)(B).40
Of additional interest to Virginia civil practitioners, the su-
preme court ruled that it was unable to review the trial court's
limitation of the plaintiffs cross-examination of one of the defen-
dant's witnesses on the grounds that the issue had not been pre-
served for appeal.41 The supreme court reminded practitioners,
"When trial testimony is excluded before it is delivered, an appel-
late court lacks a basis for reviewing a circuit court's evidentiary
35. Id.
36. Id. at 238, 682 S.E.2d at 537-38.
37. Id. at 245, 682 S.E.2d at 541.
38. Id. at 245-46, 682 S.E.2d at 542.
39. Id. at 246, 682 S.E.2d at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 246-47, 682 S.E.2d at 542. Rule 4:7(d)(3)(B) states as follows: "Errors and
irregularities occurring at the oral examination ... in the form of the questions or answers
. . . and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly pre-
sented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposi-
tion." VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:7(d)(3)(B) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
41. Graham, 278 Va. at 248-49, 682 S.E.2d at 543.
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ruling unless the record reflects a proper proffer."42 Because the
plaintiff had not proffered the anticipated testimony that would
have been elicited on cross-examination, the court ruled that it
could not determine whether the trial court's ruling prejudiced
the plaintiff.43
In addition, the plaintiff challenged the trial court's decision
that his counsel could not, during closing argument, point the ju-
rors to X-rays that had been admitted into evidence and invite
them to engage in comparisons of the X-rays.44 In upholding the
trial court's ruling, the supreme court noted, "Although counsel
for a party generally has wide latitude in making closing argu-
ments, counsel may not argue as evidence in the case matters
that do not appear in the record."45 The court then concluded that
in asking the jury to compare the X-rays, plaintiffs counsel was
effectively calling for the jury to conclude that the defect in the
femoral head stopped expanding after the screw installed by the
defendant was removed.46 Such a conclusion could not be drawn
by the jury from the X-rays themselves without expert testimony
on the subject.
B. Suits by Administrators and Executors of Estates
In Hawthorne v. Van Marter, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the administrators of an estate did not have the ability
to file a pro se appeal.4 8The Hawthorne case involved an automo-
bile accident in which a Roanoke County police vehicle driven by
an officer struck another vehicle, killing the driver and injuring a
passenger.4 9 The officer filed a plea in bar on the grounds that so-
vereign immunity barred the plaintiffs' claims of ordinary negli-
gence.50 The plea was sustained by the trial court, which also de-
nied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the ruling.5' At trial, the
42. Id. at 249, 682 S.E.2d at 543.
43. Id., 682 S.E.2d at 544.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 250, 682 S.E.2d at 544.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
48. 279 Va. 566, 576, 692 S.E.2d 226, 233 (2010) (citing Kone v. Wilson, 272 Va. 59,
62-63, 630 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2006)).
49. Id. at 571, 692 S.E.2d at 230.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 572-73, 692 S.E.2d at 230-31.
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jury rendered a verdict in favor of the officer, and the court en-
tered final judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.2
The officer moved to dismiss the appeal of the estate of the de-
ceased driver because the appeal had been filed by the adminis-
trators of the estate in a pro se capacity.51 Noting that the admin-
istrators could "act only in a representative capacity for the
beneficiaries of the Hawthorne Estate" and therefore could not
file an appeal in a pro se capacity because they "were not the true
parties in interest," the Supreme Court of Virginia granted the
motion to dismiss.54 In so ruling, the court also noted that the no-
tice of appeal filed on behalf of the passenger co-plaintiff did not
perfect the appeal as to the estate.55 Although the rules provide
for a single notice of appeal to be filed on behalf of all parties
when two or more cases have been tried together, in the instant
matter the parties had filed separate notices of appeal, and the
co-plaintiff's notice did not purport to be filed on behalf of the es-
tate.6
In Idoux v. Estate of Helou, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed issues regarding tolling of the statute of limitations and
the proper party in actions involving an estate."7 The Helou case
began when Thomas Idoux filed a pro se warrant in debt in the
general district court against Raja Helou to seek damages for He-
lou's alleged negligence in connection with an automobile acci-
dent.,8 Helou had died prior to the filing of the warrant in debt
and the general district court dismissed the action without preju-
dice because Idoux had named a deceased defendant. 9 Months
later, Idoux filed a negligence action in the circuit court against
the "Estate of Raja Alexander Helou."60 Idoux later served the
complaint on the estate's personal representative after the limita-
tions period had expired.', The estate responded by filing "a plea
in bar asserting that the Estate [was not] a proper party to this
52. Id. at 574, 692 S.E.2d at 232.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 576, 692 S.E.2d at 232-33.
55. Id. at 575, 692 S.E.2d at 232.
56. Id. (applying VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5, R. 5:9(c) (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
57. 279 Va. 548, 551, 691 S.E.2d 773, 774-75 (2010).
58. Id., 691 S.E.2d at 774.
59. Id., 691 S.E.2d at 774-75.
60. Id., 691 S.E.2d at 775 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id.
190 [Vol. 45:183
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action, that the complaint could not be amended to substitute the
personal representative [as the proper defendant], and that the
applicable statute of limitations had expired."62 The trial court
sustained the plea and dismissed the case."
On appeal, Idoux contended that the statute of limitations was
tolled under Virginia Code section 8.01-6.2(B) when he mistaken-
ly filed his action against the estate.6 4 This section of the Virginia
Code provides:
In the event that suit is filed against the estate of a decedent, and
filed within the applicable statute of limitations, naming the proper
name of estate of the deceased and service is effected or attempted
on an individual or individuals as executor, administrator or other
officers of the estate, such filing tolls the statute of limitations for
said claim in the event the executor, administrator or other officers
of the estate are unable to legally receive service at the time service
was attempted, or defend suit because their authority as executor,
administrator or other officer of the estate excludes defending said
actions, or their duties as executor, administrator or other officer of
the estate had expired at the time of service or during the time of de-
fending said action.6 5
In rejecting Idoux's argument that the limitations period was
tolled, the supreme court emphasized the general rules that: (1)
in order to toll the statute of limitations a suit must be filed
against a proper party, and (2) an action against an estate is a
nullity which cannot toll the limitations period.66 The supreme
court characterized Virginia Code section 8.01-6.2(B) as creating
statutory exceptions to these general rules and focused on wheth-
er Idoux's complaint qualified for the statutory exception invoked
when an administrator or executor is legally unable to receive
service at the time attempted. 7 The court held that section 8.01-
6.2(B) did not apply to Idoux's claim because the personal repre-
sentative of the Helou estate had qualified and was legally able to
receive service of an action filed with the proper name before the
expiration of the statue of limitations.68
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 552, 691 S.E.2d at 775.
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
66. Idoux, 279 Va. at 553, 691 S.E.2d at 776 (quoting Swann v. Marks, 252 Va. 181,
184, 476 S.E.2d 170, 171-72 (1996)).
67. Id. at 553-54, 691 S.E.2d at 776 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 554-55, 691 S.E.2d at 776 (citing James v. Peyton, 277 Va. 443, 453 n.3, 674
1912010]
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Idoux also contended that Virginia Code section 8.01-229(B)(2)
entitled him to amend his suit to include the personal representa-
tive as a defendant.69 This section states:
Death of person against whom personal action may be brought.-
a. If a person against whom a personal action may be brought dies
before the commencement of such action and before the expiration of
the limitation period for commencement thereof then a claim may be
filed against the decedent's estate or an action may be commenced
against the decedent's personal representative before the expiration
of the applicable limitation period or within one year after the quali-
fication of such personal representative, whichever occurs later.
b. If a person against whom a personal action may be brought dies
before suit papers naming such person as defendant have been filed
with the court, then such suit papers may be amended to substitute
the decedent's personal representative as party defendant before the
expiration of the applicable limitation period or within two years af-
ter the date such suit papers were filed with the court, whichever oc-
curs later, and such suit papers shall be taken as properly filed. 0
The supreme court rejected Idoux's argument and held that sec-
tion 8.01-229(B)(2) did not save his claim because Idoux never
filed an action against the personal representative prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations or within one year from
the date of the personal representative's qualification." The court
also noted that Idoux's warrant in debt was dismissed rather
than amended; thus, section 8.01-229(B)(2) was not applicable.72
In Antisdel v. Ashby, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
the issue of whether an administrator of an estate who had been
appointed solely for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death ac-
tion had standing to assert survival claims on behalf of the es-
tate." The court held that the administrator lacked standing.74 In
Antisdel, a suicide victim's mother sought and achieved confirma-
tion as the administrator of her son's estate "for purposes estab-
lished under Code of Virginia section 8.01-50 et seq."'6 Prior to
S.E.2d 864, 868 n.3 (2009)).
69. Id. at 555, 691 S.E.2d at 776-77.
70. § 8.01-229(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
71. Idoux, 279 Va. at 556-57, 691 S.E.2d at 777-78.
72. Id. at 556, 691 S.E.2d at 777.
73. 279 Va. 42, 45, 688 S.E.2d 163, 165 (2010).
74. Id. at 49, 688 S.E.2d at 167.
75. Id. at 45, 688 S.E.2d at 165. Virginia Code section 8.01-50 provides the mechanism
under which wrongful death claims must be brought. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum.
Supp. 2010).
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seeking her appointment order, the administrator had filed a
wrongful death claim against certain doctors who had treated her
son and against the manufacturers and distributors of medica-
tions prescribed to him for acne treatment and anxiety-like symp-
toms.16 The complaint was later amended to add survival claims
for personal injuries suffered by her son during his lifetime." Af-
ter nonsuiting the action, as well as a subsequent action alleging
the same claims, the administrator filed a third complaint raising
only survival claims for personal injuries due to certain alleged
side effects and interactions of her son's prescription medica-
tions.78 The defendants filed pleas in bar, which were granted by
the trial court on the ground that the administrator lacked stand-
ing to bring the survival claims because the appointment order
provided only for the initiation of a wrongful death action.79
On appeal, the administrator argued that under Virginia Code
section 64.1-75.1 the clerk may appoint an administrator for pur-
poses of bringing both survival and wrongful death claims; there-
fore, the clerk lacked authority to limit the administrator's ap-
pointment to the ability to only bring a wrongful death claim.80
The supreme court rejected this argument, reasoning that noth-
ing in section 64.1-75.1 required the clerk to authorize the admin-
istrator to bring both types of actions contemplated under the sta-
tute when the request had only been made for a wrongful death
claim.",
The court also held that the trial court did not err in refusing to
reform the appointment order nunc pro tunc to allow the admin-
istrator to pursue a survival action.82 The court noted that the
purpose of nunc pro tunc orders "is to correct mistakes or omis-
sions in the record so that the record properly reflects the events
76. Antisdel, 279 Va. at 45-46, 688 S.E.2d at 165.
77. Id. at 46, 688 S.E.2d at 165.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 46-47, 688 S.E.2d at 165.
81. Id. at 49, 688 S.E.2d at 167. The court also noted that the ability of an administra-
tor to be appointed solely for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death claim was con-
firmed by Virginia Code section 26.12.2, which exempts a personal representative ap-
pointed for the sole purpose of bringing a wrongful death claim from the requirements of
inventory and settlement filing otherwise applicable to estate administrators. Id. at 50,
688 S.E.2d at 167.
82. Id. at 50, 688 S.E.2d at 168.
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that actually took place."" Because the clerk's order appointing
the administrator accurately reflected the application made by
the administrator, the court ruled that entry of a nunc pro tunc
order "would have created a fiction, establishing the granting of a
fiduciary power that never existed."8 4
C. Preservation of Objections for Appeal
The issue of preservation of objections for appeal was ad-
dressed in detail by the Supreme Court of Virginia in two sepa-
rate civil cases. 5 In Johnson v. Hart, a legal malpractice action
brought by the testamentary beneficiary to a decedent's estate,
the trial court ruled that the testamentary beneficiary lacked
standing to bring an action against the attorney for her deceased
mother's estate. 6 In a motion for summary judgment, the defen-
dant attorney contended that the beneficiary could not bring a
malpractice claim because any attorney-client relationship was
between himself and the estate.' In response, the beneficiary con-
tended that Virginia Code section 8.01-13 permitted her, as a
beneficial owner of the estate, to sue in her individual capacity for
malpractice.88 The trial court granted summary judgment to the
attorney, stating in its letter opinion that while section 8.01-13
would appear to allow the plaintiff, as beneficiary of the estate, to
bring a malpractice claim, that provision should not act to over-
ride the policy against malpractice suits by strangers to the at-
torney-client relationship."1 Counsel for the beneficiary endorsed
the order memorializing the trial court's decision "[s]een and ob-
83. Id. at 50-51, 688 S.E.2d at 168 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 51, 688 S.E.2d at 168.
85. See Johnson v. Hart, 279 Va. 617, 624, 692 S.E.2d 239, 243 (2010); United Leasing
Corp. v. Lehner Family Bus. Trust, 279 Va. 510, 513, 689 S.E.2d 670, 671 (2010).
86. 279 Va. at 619-20, 625-26, 692 S.E.2d at 240-41, 244.
87. Id. at 620, 622, 692 S.E.2d at 241.
88. Id. at 622, 692 S.E.2d at 242. According to Virginia Code section 8.01-13, the "as-
signee or beneficial owner of any bond, note, writing or other chose in action . . . may
maintain thereon in his own name any action which the original obligee, payee, or con-
tracting party might have brought." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-13 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum.
Supp. 2010). The beneficiary conceded that Virginia law prohibits assignment of a legal
malpractice claim, but contended that she could nevertheless bring such a claim as a bene-
ficial owner. Johnson, 279 Va. at 622, 692 S.E.2d at 242.
89. 279 Va. at 622, 692 S.E.2d at 242.
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jected to," and the defendant's attorney endorsed the order "[s]een
and consented to."90
The beneficiary appealed the trial court's decision that she
lacked standing to bring a malpractice claim, and the defendant
cross-appealed on the issue of the court's application of section
8.01-13.91 On appeal, the beneficiary argued that the defendant
had waived his objections to the portions of the court's ruling that
she was a beneficial owner of the malpractice claim under section
8.01-13 by virtue of his having endorsed the dismissal order "seen
and consented to.""2 The court rejected this position, ruling that
"the context of [the defendant's] endorsement, as the prevailing
party, indicates that he consented to the trial court's order grant-
ing his motion for summary judgment."93 Regarding the trial
court's decision on whether the plaintiff was a beneficial owner of
the action, the supreme court ruled that the defendant had clear-
ly stated his opposition to that position in his memoranda filed in
support of his summary judgment motion "and cannot be deemed
to have abandoned this position by acquiescing in a summary
judgment order in his favor.94
On the substantive standing issue, the supreme court also
ruled that section 8.01-13 "does not permit beneficial ownership
of a cause of action for legal malpractice."9 5 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court emphasized that a claim for legal malpractice
requires first and foremost an attorney-client relationship, which
is the basis for the prohibition on assignment of legal malpractice
claims.96 Because no attorney-client relationship existed between
the attorney and the beneficiary in her individual capacity, she
lacked standing to bring the claim.97
In United Leasing Corp. v. Lehner Family Business Trust, the
supreme court addressed the preservation of objections when re-
90. Id. at 623, 692 S.E.2d at 242 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 624, 692 S.E.2d at 243.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 626, 692 S.E.2d at 244 (citing Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1086, 266
S.E.2d 108, 112-13 (1980)).
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newing a motion to strike at the conclusion of trial.9 8 United Leas-
ing involved a breach of contract claim brought by a trust pur-
suant to an alleged assignment of the cause of action to the
trust.99 At the conclusion of the plaintiffs evidence the defendant
moved to strike on the grounds of failure to prove an assignment
of the cause of action and failure to prove breach of contract.00
The trial court overruled the motion, and the defendant put on
additional evidence in support of its defense, including testimony
from two witnesses.', At the close of all the evidence, the defen-
dant renewed its motion to strike and presented an argument fo-
cused on the plaintiffs lack of evidence concerning damages but
omitted mention of the previously argued position that the plain-
tiff had failed to prove a valid assignment.102 The court overruled
the renewed motion to strike as well as other post-trial motions
and entered judgment against the defendant based on the jury's
verdict.1o3
On appeal, the defendant assigned error to the trial court's
denial of its motion to strike, contending that the evidence did not
establish a valid assignment of the claim to the trust.0o In re-
sponse, the plaintiff argued-and the supreme court agreed-that
the defendant was barred from pursuing the assignment argu-
ment on appeal because it had failed to include that issue in its
renewed motion to strike at the conclusion of the evidence. 0' In
arriving at its conclusion, the court noted that "[w]hen a defen-
dant chooses to introduce evidence [in support of its] defense, [it]
demonstrates by [its] conduct the intent to abandon the argument
that the [plaintiff] failed to meet its burden through the evidence
presented in its case-in-chief."06 As a result, the defendant has an
obligation to fully inform the court of the grounds upon which it
relies in making any new motion to strike at the conclusion of all
the evidence.o'0 Because the defendant was required to identify
98. 279 Va. 510, 513, 689 S.E.2d 670, 671 (2010).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 514-15, 689 S.E.2d at 672.
101. Id. at 515, 689 S.E.2d at 672.
102. Id. at 515-16, 689 S.E.2d at 672-73.
103. Id. at 516, 689 S.E.2d at 673.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 516, 520, 689 S.E.2d at 673, 675.
106. Id. at 517-18, 689 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting Graham v. Cook, 278 Va. 233, 248, 682
S.E.2d 535, 543 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 518, 689 S.E.2d at 674. The supreme court also noted that, because it came
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the grounds upon which it based its motion to strike at the con-
clusion of the evidence and failed to do so, the court held that the
issue of validity of the assignment was not preserved for purposes
of appeal under Rule 5:25.10
D. Nonsuits
In City of Suffolk v. Lummis Gin Co., the Supreme Court of
Virginia addressed whether the nonsuit in question was a second
nonsuit for which attorney fees and costs could be awarded under
Code section 8.01-380(B) or was a first nonsuit of right for which
there could be no such award.0 In addition, the court addressed
whether the trial court's order granting the nonsuit was a final
order for purposes of Rule 1:1.110 In Lummis Gin Co., the City of
Suffolk ("City"), seeking to sell certain parcels of land located
within city bounds in order to satisfy liens for delinquent real es-
tate taxes, brought a suit against numerous alleged property
owners."' The City filed a motion for a nonsuit so "that th[e] ac-
tion [would] stand dismissed as to the defendant, Lummis Gin
Co., without prejudice to the bringing of another action."112 The
City later brought another action seeking to satisfy all delinquent
taxes on the same parcel that had been identified in the first suit
as belonging to Lummis Gin Company."3 The City named the
Lummis Gin Company and other individuals as defendants in the
second suit, but the only defendants who responded to the later
suit were a group of individuals identified as the Baker heirs.114
When the City submitted a proposed nonsuit order for the second
suit during a hearing, the Baker heirs contended that the City
was making a request for a second nonsuit and asked the court to
award them attorney fees and costs."5 In addressing the issue,
after additional evidence had been presented, the defendant's renewed motion to strike
was in reality a new motion. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 &
Cum. Supp. 2010) (providing that a party "make[] known to the court the action which he
desires the court to take or his objections to the actions of the court and his grounds there-
for").
108. United Leasing, 279 Va. at 520, 689 S.E.2d at 675.
109. 278 Va. 270, 273, 683 S.E.2d 549, 550 (2009).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id., 683 S.E.2d at 551.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 273-74, 683 S.E.2d at 551.
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the trial court stated at the hearing that it would enter the non-
suit order and retain the case on the docket for purposes of consi-
dering the issues of fees and costs and whether it was a first or
second nonsuit." That same day, the trial court entered an order
granting the nonsuit and further ordering that the "suit shall re-
main on the docket for the Court to determine issues concerning
attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred by [the Baker heirs] ."117
The parties subsequently briefed their positions and appeared
again before the court for argument approximately six months af-
ter the entry of the nonsuit order in question.118 On the nonsuit
issue, the City contended that the nonsuit in the earlier case was
only as to Lummis Gin Company and so the subsequent nonsuit
was a first nonsuit as to the Baker heirs, who were not named as
parties to the initial proceeding."9 The City further argued that
the nonsuit order in question was a final order for purposes of
Rule 1:1 and that the court had lost jurisdiction to determine the
issue of fees and costs because more than twenty-one days had
passed since the order was entered.120 The trial court disagreed
with the City on both counts and entered a "Final Order" in favor
of the Baker heirs for their fees and costs, ruling that the case
presented a second nonsuit and denying the City's request for a
ruling that the court had lost jurisdiction under Rule 1:1.121
On appeal, as to the nonsuit issue, the supreme court ruled
that the Baker heirs were not parties to the first proceeding and
therefore focused on whether the second proceeding was the same
cause of action as the first for purposes of Virginia Code section
8.01-380,122 which allows that "one nonsuit may be taken to a
cause of action or against the same party to the proceeding, as a
matter of right."12 3 The court then ruled that the second action
necessarily involved the satisfaction of different delinquent taxes
than the first case and so was not the same cause of action.124 As a
116. Id. at 274, 683 S.E.2d at 551.
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 274-75, 683 S.E.2d at 551.
122. Id. at 275-76, 683 S.E.2d at 552.
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
124. Lummis Gin Co., 278 Va. at 276, 683 S.E.2d at 552.
198 [Vol. 45:183
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
result, the City had an absolute right to nonsuit the second case
and the trial court had no ability to award fees and costs. 25
While its holding on the nonsuit issue resolved the appeal, the
court also took the opportunity to address the finality of the non-
suit order for purposes of Rule 1:1.126 On that subject, the court
pointed to prior precedent that a nonsuit order is subject to Rule
1:1 and stated that the trial court therefore had only twenty-one
days to address the issue of fees and costs before it lost jurisdic-
tion to do so, despite the language in the order that the case
would remain on the docket so that the issue could be deter-
mined.127 As more than twenty-one days had passed since the date
of the nonsuit order, the court's subsequent "final order" award-
ing the Baker heirs their fees and costs was a "nullity. "128
E. Final Orders
The Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed the finality of
orders in Hutchins v. Talbert, this time in the context of the dead-
line for noting an appeal.=> The order in question was an order
denying a motion to set aside the verdict. 0 In this medical mal-
practice case, the jury awarded a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
for $4 million, which was reduced by the trial court to $885,000 to
account for an earlier settlement with a co-defendant and the lim-
it set on malpractice damages under Virginia Code sections 8.01-
35.1 and 8.01-581.15.13 This judgment was memorialized in an
order dated April 25, 2008, entitled "Final Order," concluding
with the statement "AND THIS CAUSE IS ENDED."13 2 That
same day, however, the trial court also entered an order labeled
"Suspending Order," stating that the final order was suspended
for fourteen days, thus tolling the running of the twenty-one day
period under Rule 1:1 and allowing a total of thirty-five days for
entry of an amended final order.3 3
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 276-77, 683 S.E.2d at 552-53 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 277, 683 S.E.2d at 553.
129. 278 Va. 650, 652, 685 S.E.2d 658, 659 (2009).
130. Id.
131. Id. (citations omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside the ver-
dict, which the trial court denied by an order dated May 28, 2008
that only addressed the motion and did not refer to the final or-
der. 34 No additional orders were entered by the trial court. 1 5 The
defendant filed his notice of appeal on June 19, 2008, and the
plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the
trial court's final judgment order ended on May 9, 2008 and was
not thereafter amended, vacated, or suspended. 3 6 The plaintiff
argued that the defendant was therefore required by Rule 5:9 to
file a notice of appeal within thirty days of May 9, 2008; thus, the
June 19 filing was untimely.'1 The defendant responded to the
motion by contending that, because he had filed a post-trial mo-
tion, which was ruled upon while the trial court still had jurisdic-
tion, the thirty-day period under Rule 5:9 began on May 28-the
date of the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside the
verdict-and his appeal was therefore timely.138
In granting the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the appeal, the su-
preme court began by noting that the thirty-day period under
Rule 5:9 for filing a notice of appeal begins upon "the entry of fi-
nal judgment."139 The court also emphasized that under Rule 5:5,
"[t]he time period for filing the notice of appeal is not extended by
the filing of a motion for a new trial, a petition for rehearing, or a
like pleading unless the final judgment is modified, vacated, or
suspended by the trial court pursuant to Rule 1:1," which the tri-
al court's subsequent order denying the defendant's motion to set
aside the verdict did not do.o4 1 In analyzing when the time for fil-
ing the notice of appeal began to run, the court held that the trial
court had properly suspended its final judgment for a period of
fourteen days through its suspending order, and that the four-
teen-day period was self-executing and expired on May 9, 2008,
thus beginning the thirty-day filing period under Rule 5:9.1' Ac-
134. Id. at 652-53, 685 S.E.2d at 659.
135. Id. at 653, 685 S.E.2d at 659.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 653-55, 685 S.E.2d at 659-30 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5, R. 5.9(a) (Repl.
Vol. 2010)).
140. Id. at 653-54, 685 S.E.2d at 660 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5, R. 5:5(a) (Repl. Vol.
2010)).
141. Id. at 654, 685 S.E.2d at 660.
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cording to the court, because the notice was not filed within thirty
days of May 9, it was untimely, and the appeal was dismissed.142
F. Trial Transcripts and Written Statements of Fact
In a case of particular significance for indigent parties seeking
to see their case all the way through from a general district court
trial to appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in Shapiro v.
Younkin that a circuit court erred in dismissing an appeal from
general district court for the plaintiffs failure to obtain a court
reporter for the proceeding.143 The plaintiff in Shapiro filed a suit
pro se in general district court over a landlord-tenant dispute,
and the suit was dismissed.144 The plaintiff, again proceeding pro
se, appealed the general district court's ruling to the circuit court,
and the case was set for trial.14 On the day of the circuit court
trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs case with prejudice based
on his noncompliance with a local court rule that required a court
reporter to be present at the trial of all civil matters, unless the
requirement is waived upon approval of the court prior to the tri-
al date."'
The plaintiff had admittedly not sought prior approval to waive
the requirement of a court reporter, but did so before the trial be-
gan on the grounds of indigence.'14 The trial court denied the re-
quest, finding the plaintiff possessed sufficient funds to pay for a
court reporter and "that there was a high likelihood of appeal by
the non-prevailing party and .. . a statement of facts would be in-
sufficient for appeal."48 Later that day, following the dismissal of
his case, the plaintiff submitted to the court a proposed written
statement of facts for purposes of his appeal to the supreme
court. 4 The trial court refused to certify the proposed statement
and instead wrote directly on the proposed statement that the
142. Id. at 655, 685 S.E.2d at 660.
143. 279 Va. 256, 266-67, 688 S.E.2d 157, 163 (2010).
144. Id. at 259, 688 S.E.2d at 159.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 260, 688 S.E.2d at 159.
147. Id.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. at 261, 688 S.E.2d at 159.
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case was dismissed on procedural grounds and that thus no
statement of facts should be necessary for an appeal.o50
On appeal, the plaintiff argued, and the supreme court agreed,
that the trial court had violated Virginia Code section 17.1-128
and Rule 5:11 by dismissing the case for lack of a court reporter
and rejecting the plaintiffs proposed statement of facts. 5' Section
17.1-128 provides that "[t]he failure to secure the services of a re-
porter, or the failure to have the case reported or recorded for any
other reason, shall not affect the proceeding or trial."152 Rule 5:11,
which addresses transcripts and written statements of fact, pro-
vides that a written statement of fact becomes part of the record
when "signed by the trial judge and filed in the office of the
clerk."'' The rule further provides that "[t]he judge may sign the
statement forthwith upon its presentation to him if it is signed by
counsel for all parties, but if objection is made to the accuracy or
completeness of the statement, it shall be signed in accordance
with subsection (d) of this Rule."154 According to subsection (d) of
Rule 5:11, upon proper notice of objection to a proposed statement
of facts, the trial court shall "(1) overrule the objections; or (2)
make any corrections the he deems necessary; or (3) include any
accurate additions to make the record complete; or (4) certify the
manner in which the record is incomplete; and (5) sign the tran-
script or written statement."'65 As to Rule 5:11, the supreme court
ruled that the trial court's annotations of the proposed written
statement did not comply with the rule and that, at a minimum,
the court should have signed the statement and certified the
manner in which the record was incomplete.156 In summarizing
the grounds for its reversal of the trial court's judgment and re-
mand for a trial on the merits, the supreme court issued the fol-
lowing rebuke to the trial court:
We take this opportunity to emphasize that in the absence of a writ-
ten transcript, when a litigant has taken all available measures to
provide the circuit court with an accurate and complete record of the
proceedings, and the trial judge nevertheless is unable to create a
150. Id., 688 S.E.2d at 159-60.
151. Id. at 261-62, 688 S.E.2d at 160.
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-128 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
153. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5, R. 5:11(c)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
154. Id.
155. Id. R. 5:11(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (emphasis added).
156. Shapiro, 279 Va. at 266, 688 S.E.2d at 162.
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complete written statement for purposes of appeal after consultation
with all parties, the proper remedy is to order a new trial .... A cir-
cuit court is not authorized to dismiss a case based solely on a liti-
gant's failure to obtain the services of a court reporter, and later to
refuse to certify the litigant's proposed statement of facts because it
is inaccurate."s'
G. Juror Challenges
In Roberts v. CSX Transportation, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Virginia addressed a trial court's failure to strike for cause a po-
tential juror who was a stockholder of the defendant corporation,
thereby forcing the plaintiff to use a peremptory challenge to re-
move the individual from the panel."68 The Roberts case involved
the trial of a personal injury claim brought by an employee of a
railroad company.159 During voir dire regarding matters that
might reveal bias, a potential juror revealed that he had been a
shareholder of the railroad for approximately thirty years, al-
though he also stated in response to follow-up questions from the
court that he did not actively participate in annual meetings of
the company and did not feel his status as a stockholder would af-
fect his ability to be impartial.160 The plaintiff moved that the po-
tential juror be stricken for cause due to his status as a long-time
shareholder, but the trial court denied the motion. 16' The plaintiff
subsequently used one of his peremptory challenges to remove
the stockholder from the panel.162 Following the trial and the
jury's verdict, the plaintiff moved for a new trial, inter alia, on the
ground that the court erred by refusing to remove the stockholder
juror for cause, and the court denied the motion.'6 3
In reversing the trial court's decision and remanding for a new
trial, the supreme court stated that being a stockholder in a com-
pany that is a party to the suit is a per se disqualifier for service
on the jury.164 The court then held that it is "prejudicial error in
the civil context when a trial court forces a party to use a peremp-
157. Id., 688 S.E.2d at 162-63 (internal citations omitted).
158. 279 Va. 111, 114, 688 S.E.2d 178, 180 (2010).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 115, 688 S.E.2d at 180.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 116--17, 122, 688 S.E.2d at 181, 184-85.
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tory strike afforded under Code § 8.01-359 to remove a venireper-
son who is not 'free from exception' and should have been struck
for cause."165 According to the court, the trial court's error in rul-
ing on the motion to strike the potential juror for cause was not
rendered harmless by the plaintiffs removal of the individual
through the peremptory strike process because the plaintiff "was
entitled, as a matter of law, to have a panel free from exception
upon which to exercise his peremptory strikes."166
H. Dead Man's Statute
The application of Virginia's "Dead Man's Statute" was the is-
sue in the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Virginia Home
for Boys and Girls v. Phillips.167 The statute provides as follows:
In an action by or against a person who, from any cause, is incapable
of testifying, or by or against the committee, trustee, executor, ad-
ministrator, heir, or other representative of the person so incapable
of testifying, no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of an
adverse or interested party founded on his uncorroborated testimo-
ny.168
The question of the application of the Dead Man's Statute in Phil-
lips arose out of a dispute between a devisee under a will and a
relative of the testator over an alleged oral agreement regarding
the disposition of a farm.169 The plaintiff alleged that he had en-
tered into an oral agreement with his uncle and his uncle's wife
whereby he would receive the assets of their estate upon their
deaths in exchange for, among other things, his agreement to
move to their property and work on the farm.o70 The plaintiff con-
tended that this oral agreement was made during a conversation
around his uncle's kitchen table at which only the parties were
present."' Contrary to the agreement alleged by the plaintiff,
however, the uncle died leaving all his property to his wife, and
165. Id. at 117, 688 S.E.2d at 181 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 118, 688 S.E.2d at 182. In reaching this conclusion, the court conducted a
choice of law analysis to determine that Virginia, rather than federal, law governed as to
the issue of error in regard to failure to strike the potential juror for cause. See id. at 118-
22, 688 S.E.2d at 182-84.
167. 279 Va. 279, 282, 688 S.E.2d 284, 285 (2010).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
169. 279 Va. at 282-84, 688 S.E.2d at 285-86.
170. Id. at 282-83, 688 S.E.2d at 285-86.
171. Id.
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upon her death, she left all of her property to the Virginia Home
for Boys and Girls ("Home").172 The trial court awarded the prop-
erty to the plaintiff, and the Home appealed.'7
On appeal, the Home contended that the Dead Man's Statute
barred the plaintiffs claim because the record was "devoid of any
evidence, aside from the testimony of [the plaintiff] himself, that
the 1977 kitchen-table conference ever took place, that any oral
agreement was ever made, or, if such an agreement was made,
what its terms and conditions were."174 Addressing the statute's
requirement of corroboration, the court noted that such corrobo-
ration may be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence, but
stated that the one essential requirement is that the "evidence, to
be corroborative, must be independent of the surviving witness. It
must not depend upon his credibility or upon circumstances un-
der his control."1' Because the record revealed no evidence of the
oral agreement that was independent of the plaintiffs testimony,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden under
the Dead Man's Statute to prove the existence of the oral agree-
ment to leave him the property in question.17 6
I. Arbitration Awards
In Cotton Creek Circles, L.L.C. v. San Luis Valley Water Co.,
the Supreme Court of Virginia once again affirmed the sanctity of
arbitration awards and emphasized the limited grounds upon
which a court may overturn them."' The Cotton Creek case in-
volved the alleged violation of a non-compete clause contained
within the operating agreement of an L.L.C., which also con-
tained an agreement to arbitrate "ANY DISPUTE WITH
RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT."78 Following a ruling by the
arbitration panel that the non-compete clause had not been
172. Id. at 283-84, 688 S.E.2d at 286.
173. Id. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 286.
174. Id., 688 S.E.2d at 287.
175. Id. at 286, 688 S.E.2d at 287-88.
176. Id. at 286-87, 688 S.E.2d at 288. In so holding, the court also ruled that the plain-
tiff had failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds through proof of part performance of an oral
agreement. Id. at 287, 688 S.E.2d at 288; see VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(6) (Repl. Vol. 2006 &
Cum. Supp. 2010) (providing that any contract for the sale or lease of real estate for more
than one year must satisfy statute of frauds).
177. 279 Va. 320, 689 S.E.2d 675 (2010).
178. Id. at 322-23, 689 S.E.2d at 677.
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breached, the losing party filed a motion, which was denied by
the circuit court, to vacate the award pursuant to section 10(a)(4)
of the Federal Arbitration Act 79 ("FAA") on the grounds that the
panel had exceeded its powers by ignoring the unambiguous
terms of the non-compete clause. 0 In affirming the trial court's
decision to confirm the arbitration panel's award, the supreme
court noted that under the FAA, "arbitrators do not exceed their
powers if they misinterpret a contract or make errors of law."''
The court then noted that the record revealed that the arbitrators
had interpreted the non-compete clause, and that the grounds for
vacatur under the FAA do not allow a court to overturn an arbi-
trator's award merely based on a party's disagreement with the
arbitrator's decision or an arbitrator's mistaken interpretation of
a contract. 182
J. Declaratory Judgment
In Bell v. Saunders, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a
trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to a complaint for decla-
ratory judgment and, in so doing, provided guidance as to the
pleading standards for such actions.'8 Bell involved a claim for
declaratory judgment filed by the beneficiaries of two separate
wills who were seeking guidance regarding the proper interpreta-
tion of the wills. 84 The defendant was an attorney who served as
executor and trustee under one of the wills and who allegedly
drafted the other will.16 Plaintiffs' complaint set forth certain
provisions of the first will regarding payment of income from the
trust estate and alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had failed
to make requested income payments and had stated that he did
not believe he had to disburse any of the estate at that time.86 As
to the second will, the complaint alleged that, although the de-
fendant had not qualified as executor, he had drafted the will and
had taken an active role in obtaining the property of the decedent
but had refused to provide an accounting to one of the plaintiff
179. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
180. Cotton Creek, 279 Va. at 323, 689 S.E.2d at 677.
181. Id. at 325, 689 S.E.2d at 678 (citations omitted).
182. Id.
183. 278 Va. 49, 677 S.E.2d 39 (2009).
184. Id. at 51-53, 677 S.E.2d at 40.
185. Id. at 51-52, 677 S.E.2d at 40.
186. Id. at 52, 677 S.E.2d at 40.
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beneficiaries.' Defendant demurred on the grounds that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action, failed to state a case of
actual controversy, and failed to state facts upon which relief
could be granted.8s The trial court sustained the demurrer, and
the plaintiff appealed.8 9
As to the complaint of the beneficiary of the first will, the su-
preme court reversed the trial court, holding that the complaint
had sufficiently stated a claim for declaratory judgment. 9 o The
court ruled that "Code § 8.01-184 clearly. .. confers upon a cir-
cuit court in cases of actual controversy the power to issue a dec-
laratory judgment . .. [as to] the interpretation of a will" and that
the complaint had "pled a justiciable controversy which includes
specific adverse claims based on present facts that are ripe for ad-
judication." 9' Regarding the complaint of the beneficiary under
the second will, however, the supreme court upheld the trial
court's dismissal because the complaint had pled that the defen-
dant was not qualified as executor, which meant that he could not
exercise the powers of an executor and provide the requested ac-
counting.19 2 As a result, the complaint "failed to plead the exis-
tence of an actual controversy. 93
K. Sovereign Immunity
The case of Ligon v. County of Goochland presented the Su-
preme Court of Virginia with a question of first impression-
whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim
against a county by a former employee under the whistleblower
provision of the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act ("FATA").194 The
plaintiff in Ligon brought suit against the County of Goochland
("County") under FATA's whistleblower protections, alleging that
he had been terminated because he had opposed certain allegedly
fraudulent actions by his supervisor.' 9' The County filed a demur-
187. Id.
188. Id. at 53, 677 S.E.2d at 40.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 55, 677 S.E.2d at 42.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 55-56, 677 S.E.2d at 42.
193. Id. at 56, 677 S.E.2d at 42.
194. 279 Va. 312, 314, 689 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.8 (Repl.
Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
195. 279 Va. at 314, 689 S.E.2d at 667.
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rer on the ground, inter alia, that the claim was barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which the circuit court sus-
tained.196 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the doctrine of sove-
reign immunity, while barring common law tort claims, was not
applicable to his statutory claim for retaliatory discharge, as the
FATA protects "[a]ny employee."197
In response, the County contended that the doctrine of sove-
reign immunity bars all claims against the Commonwealth and
its political subdivisions unless the immunity is expressly waived
by statute, and the FATA contains no such waiver.198 The su-
preme court agreed with the County, holding that the County was
protected by sovereign immunity from the plaintiffs retaliatory
discharge claim absent an express waiver set forth in the FATA. 99
In ruling that the "any employee" language in the statute did not
function as an express waiver of immunity, the court noted that
nothing in the language of the FATA "specifically states that em-
ployees of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions may
sue their employers for retaliatory discharge under the statute."2 00
In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that its decision
was in keeping with previous decisions in which the court had de-
clined to construe general statutory language as announcements
of waiver of sovereign immunity.201
L. Judicial Estoppel
Among a number of issues decided by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Norfolk Southern
Railway Co. was whether certain affirmative defenses were ap-
propriately stricken by the trial court on the grounds of judicial
estoppel.202 The case involved a dispute between power companies
and a railroad over a coal transportation agreement ("CTA"). 203
The power companies filed a complaint for declaratory judgment
seeking interpretation of the CTA and specific performance
196. Id. at 315, 689 S.E.2d at 668.
197. Id.; § 8.01-216.8 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
198. Ligon, 279 Va. at 316, 689 S.E.2d at 668.
199. Id. at 316, 318, 689 S.E.2d at 668-69.
200. Id. at 319, 689 S.E.2d at 670.
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. 278 Va. 444, 461, 683 S.E.2d 517, 527 (2009).
203. Id. at 450, 683 S.E.2d at 520.
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thereof, and the railroad filed a cross-bill for declaratory judg-
ment, specific performance, and breach of contract, with the pri-
mary issue in dispute being the appropriate cost adjustment fac-
tor for rates to be applied under the agreement.2 04
In the proceeding to adjudicate their complaint for a declarato-
ry judgment interpreting the CTA, the power companies con-
tended that the CTA was the contract agreed upon by the parties,
that it contained the agreed cost adjustment ratio, and that the
contract was not amended to change the ratio.205 In response to
the railroad's cross-bill, however, the power companies raised the
affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel and made allegations
that the trial court construed as assertions of law, and not fact,
arguments concerning amendment to the CTA.206 The trial court
struck the affirmative defenses on the grounds of judicial estop-
pel, which "prevents a party from assuming successive positions
in the course of a suit or series of suits with regard to the same
fact or set of facts if those facts are inconsistent or mutually con-
tradictory."207
On appeal, the power companies presented several arguments
in support of their position that they were not judicially estopped
from raising the defenses. First, the companies contended that
the assertion regarding amendment of the CTA was one of law
and not of fact.2 08 The supreme court rejected this argument out of
hand, noting that under its case law "the issue of contract
amendment is a finding of fact, not of law."209 The power compa-
nies then contended that judicial estoppel should not apply be-
cause no judgment was rendered in their favor based on their fac-
tual assertions and, in any event, there was no prejudice to the
railroad since it ultimately prevailed in its interpretation of the
CTA. 210 As to the contention that a favorable judgment was re-
quired to invoke judicial estoppel, the court noted that its prior
precedent did not support such a requirement and that "applica-
tion of the doctrine requires only that the prior inconsistent fact-
ual position must have been relied upon by the court in reaching
204. Id. at 453-54, 683 S.E.2d at 522.
205. Id. at 462, 683 S.E.2d at 527.
206. Id. at 455, 463, 683 S.E.2d at 523, 527-28.
207. Id. at 461-62, 683 S.E.2d at 527 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 463, 683 S.E.2d at 527-28.
209. Id., 683 S.E.2d at 528 (citations omitted).
210. Id. at 463, 465, 683 S.E.2d at 528-29.
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its decision."21 The court also rejected the prejudice argument,
noting that neither Virginia nor Supreme Court of the United
States' precedent has made a showing of prejudice a prerequisite
for judicial estoppel. 2 12 Because the elements of judicial estoppel
had been met, the supreme court upheld the trial court's decision
to strike the power companies' affirmative defenses. 213
M. Frivolous Pleadings
In Weatherbee v. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Fourth District-
Section I Committee, a case arising out of an attorney disciplinary
proceeding, the Supreme Court of Virginia provided a reminder to
Virginia attorneys of the dangers of filing a pleading without con-
ducting appropriate due diligence. 214 Weatherbee involved an at-
torney who filed a malpractice suit on behalf of a client who had
undergone a surgical procedure at Warren Memorial Hospital in
Warren County.215 The suit named a number of defendants, in-
cluding a Dr. Ward P. Vaughan.2 16 The problem, however, was
that "Dr. Vaughan had no involvement whatsoever" in the plain-
tiffs surgery or medical care.2 17 Indeed, when the surgery was
performed, Dr. Vaughan was not even a member of the Warren
Memorial Hospital medical staff and had no privileges to perform
medical procedures at the facility.218 This mistake on the part of
the attorney had real and unfortunate consequences for Dr.
Vaughan, as he "lost patients and [ ] was subject to ridicule and
scorn," including being named in a local radio broadcast that air-
ed the fact that he had been sued for medical malpractice once
every hour for a full day.2 19
The attorney admitted that he never contacted Dr. Vaughan to
ascertain whether he had participated in the surgery prior to fil-
ing the suit. 20 When questioned by the State Bar Investigator as
to why he named Dr. Vaughan in the lawsuit, the attorney ex-
211. Id. at 463-65, 683 S.E.2d at 528-29.
212. Id. at 466, 683 S.E.2d at 529.
213. Id.
214. 279 Va. 303, 689 S.E.2d 753 (2010).
215. Id. at 307, 689 S.E.2d at 755.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 307, 689 S.E.2d at 755.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 308, 689 S.E.2d at 756.
220. Id. at 307, 689 S.E.2d at 755.
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plained that he had obtained a report regarding his client's sur-
gery that indicated that a "Bob Vaughan" assisted the doctor who
actually performed the surgery.22 ' The attorney also consulted the
Virginia Board of Medicine website, which listed fifteen physi-
cians with the last name "Vaughan" licensed to practice in Virgin-
ia, only three of whom specialized in obstetrics and gynecology. 222
As two of these three were women whose practices were located
outside Virginia, the attorney "erroneously deduced that the re-
maining physician, Dr. Ward P. Vaughan, who practiced obste-
trics and gynecology in Winchester, Virginia, was the individual
identified as 'Bob Vaughan' in the operative report."223
According to the supreme court, the record demonstrated clear-
ly and convincingly that the attorney had filed a frivolous action
against Dr. Vaughan because it had no basis in law or fact.2 24 In
reaching this conclusion, the court also emphasized that the at-
torney never attempted to obtain his client's authorization to ac-
quire Dr. Vaughan's medical records related to her, which would
have revealed that Dr. Vaughan had no involvement in the sub-ject of the suit.225
III. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Appellate Practice
Perhaps the most significant recent changes to the Rules of
Supreme Court of Virginia ("Rules"), especially for appellate prac-
titioners, were adopted by an order of April 30, 2010, effective Ju-
ly 1, 2010, whereby the Supreme Court of Virginia amended and
re-codified Part Five and Part Five A, which govern practice be-
fore the Supreme Court of Virginia and Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, respectively. 22 6 These rule changes arose out of the work of
the Appellate Rules Advisory Committee ("Advisory Committee"),
established in 2005 by Chief Justice Hassell and chaired by Jus-
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 310, 689 S.E.2d at 756 (applying VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 3.1 (Repl. Vol.
2010)).
225. Id. at 309, 689 S.E.2d at 756.
226. Order Amending Part Five and Part Five A, Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia
(Apr. 30, 2010) (effective July 1, 2010), available at http://courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/
amendments/2010_0430part five-andpartfive-a.pdf.
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tice Lemons .22 The goals for the revision were to promote fairness
and efficiency, to make the rules more user-friendly, to reflect
technological advances, such as electronic filing, and to harmon-
ize the rules of the supreme court with those of the court of ap-
peals.228 According to Professor Kent Sinclair, who was a member
of the Advisory Committee, "Substantive changes were made to
many of the rules and almost all of the rules have had some revi-
sion made to their form. This includes changing the titles to more
accurately reflect the information contained in the rules, and in-
corporating the use of headings for each paragraph."2 29
B. Discovery Following Demurrer
By an order dated February 26, 2010 and made effective on
May 3, 2010, the Supreme Court of Virginia amended Rule 4:1(d),
which addresses the timing and sequence of discovery. 230 The
amendment provides that discovery shall continue after the filing
of a demurrer, plea, or other dispositive motion and while such
filings are awaiting decision, unless the court exercises its discre-
tion to order suspension of discovery on some or all of the issues
in the action.2 11
C. Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act
Through its order dated June 1, 2009, effective July 1, 2009,
the supreme court amended Rules 4:5 and 4:9 to reference the
Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, which had
been adopted by the General Assembly in March 2009.232 The
court amended Rule 4:5(al) by adding subsection (iv), which pro-
227. See Memorandum from Kent Sinclair, Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law to Va.
State Bar (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.vsb.org/docs/SCV-appellate-rules-05-05-
10.pdf.
228. Id.
229. Id. Professor Sinclair's memo also provides a summary highlighting several of the
specific improvements arising from the rule changes. See id.
230. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:1(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
231. Id. R. 4:1(d)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
232. Id. R. 4:5 (to be codified at VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:5), available at http://www.
courts.state.va.us/courts/SCV/amendments/2009_0601_4_5_4_9_5_7b_8_3_rule.pdf; Id. R.
4:9 (to be codified at VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:9), available at http://www.
courts.state.va.us/courts/SCV/amendments/2009_0601_4_- 5_4_9 -5_7b_8_3_rule.pdf; Act of
Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 701, 2009 Va. Acts 1493, 1493-94 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-412.8 to -412.15 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
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vides that "[d]epositions and related documentary production
sought in Virginia pursuant to a subpoena issued under authority
of a foreign jurisdiction shall be subject to the provisions of the
Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, Virginia Code
§§ 8.01-412.8 through 8.01-412.15."233 The court similarly amend-
ed Rule 4:9 to state that the production of documents and elec-
tronically stored information in Virginia pursuant to a foreign-
issued subpoena shall be subject to the Uniform Interstate Depo-
sitions and Discovery Act.23 4
D. Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order
Also included in the Supreme Court of Virginia's order dated
February 26, 2010 and made effective on May 3, 2010, was an
amendment to the Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order ("Uniform
Order"). 235 The amendment added a provision to Section XI of the
Uniform Order, governing deposition transcripts to be used at
trial.2 11 Whereas the Uniform Order previously set no specific
deadline for designating portions of non-party depositions to be
used at trial,237 the amended Uniform Order provides that "desig-
nations of portions of non-party depositions, other than for rebut-
tal or impeachment, shall be exchanged no later than 15 days be-
fore trial, except for good cause shown or by agreement of
counsel."238 Under the amended provision, following designation,
it remains the opponent's obligation to bring any objection or oth-
er unresolved issues to the court's attention prior to trial; howev-
er, the amended provision requires that the opponent also coun-
ter-designate any additional portions of the transcript at least
five days before the hearing on objections.239
233. Pt. 4, R. 4:5(al)(iv) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
234. Id. R. 4:9(b)(iv) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
235. See id. pt. 1, R. 1:18(B) app. of forms § 3 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
236. Id.
237. Id. R. 1:18(B) app. of forms § 3 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
238. Id. R. 1:18(B) app. of forms § 3 (Repl. Vol. 2010). This deadline does apply to depo-
sitions for use at trial taken after the close of discovery pursuant to Paragraph II of the
Uniform Order. See id.
239. Id.
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E. Administrative Process Act Appeals
The supreme court's order dated February 26, 2010, effective
May 3, 2010, also amended Part Two A of the Rules, governing
appeals pursuant to the Administrative Process Act. 240 The court
ordered both substantive and stylistic changes to all existing sec-
tions of Part Two A and added a new section governing small
business challenges.241 As to the substantive changes, the court
amended Rule 2A:1 to state that "[e]very agency may designate
some individual to perform the function of 'agency secretary,"'
and, if no such individual is designated, the term "agency secre-
tary" shall mean "the executive officer of the agency. "242 Rule 2A:1
was also amended to provide that in agency case decisions dispos-
ing of a license, permit or other benefit, "the applicant, licensee or
permittee shall be a necessary party" to the appeal.2 43 The court
ordered that Rule 2A:2, governing notices of appeal, be amended
with regard to the thirty-day time period for filing the notice to
provide that "[i]n the event that a case decision is required by §
2.2-4023 or by any other provision of law to be served by mail
upon a party, 3 days shall be added to the 30-day period for that
party."244
Rule 2A:3 was amended in several ways. Subsection (a) was
clarified to provide that if the transcript of a formal hearing was
taken down in writing, then the transcript shall be delivered with
the notice of appeal or within thirty days thereafter; but if the
hearing testimony was not taken down in writing, then a state-
ment of the testimony in narrative form shall be so delivered.245
Subsection (b) was amended to state that "[t]he agency secretary
shall prepare and certify the record as soon as possible after the
notice of appeal and transcript or statement of testimony is filed
and served."246 Furthermore, that subsection has been amended to
provide that
240. Order Amending Part Two A, Appeals Pursuant to the Administrative Process Act
(Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2010
0226_appendixrules2a_4_1.pdf.
241. See id.
242. Pt. 2A, R. 2A:1 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
243. Id.
244. Id. R. 2A:2 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
245. Id. R. 2A-3(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
246. Id. R. 2A:3(b) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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[o]nce the court has entered an order overruling any motions, de-
murrers and other pleas filed by the agency, or if none have been
filed within the time provided by Rule 3:8 for the filing of a response
to the process served under Rule 2A:4, the agency secretary shall, as
soon as practicable or within such time as the court may order,
transmit the record to the clerk of the court named in the notice of
appeal. 4 1
The court also added a new subsection (d) to address certification
and filing of records determined to be so voluminous that it would
be unduly burdensome to file the entire record.2 48 Subsection (d)
provides a mechanism under which the agency may file a motion
for leave to file an index to such a record. 249
The court amended Rule 2A:4, regarding petitions for appeal,
to require that within the thirty days after the filing of the notice
of appeal, the appellant shall file its petition for appeal with the
circuit court, which
shall include within such 30-day period both the payment of all fees
and the taking of all steps provided in Rule 3:2, 3:3, and 3:4 to cause
a copy of the petition for appeal to be served (as in a civil action) on
the agency secretary and on every other party.25 0
The court extensively revised Rule 2A:5, which governs further
proceedings after the filing of the petition for appeal. 25 1 Rule 2A:5
now provides that further proceedings in an administrative ap-
peal shall be governed by Part Three of the Rules, which ad-
dresses procedure for civil actions generally.252 That coverage,
however, is subject to several enumerated exceptions, including
that (1) no appeal or issue shall be referred to a commissioner in
chancery; (2) the discovery provisions of Part Four of the Rules
shall not apply to administrative appeals and no depositions may
be taken absent order of court; (3) once any motions, demurrers,
or other pleas filed by the agency have been ruled upon the ap-
peal shall be deemed submitted and no answer or further plead-
ings are required except by order of court; (4) when the case is
submitted and the record filed the court shall establish by order a
schedule for briefing and argument on the issues raised in the pe-
247. Id.
248. Id. R. 2A-3(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
249. Id.
250. Id. R. 2A:4(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
251. See id. R. 2A:5 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
252. Id.; see generally id. pt. 3 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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tition; and (5) the court shall dispose of the appeal by an order
consistent with its authority under Virginia Code sections 2.2-
4029 and -4030.263
The court also added a new section addressing small business
appeals. 254 The new rule provides that in addition to the other re-
medies established in Part Two A, any small business as defined
in Virginia Code section 2.2-4007.1(A) that "is adversely affected
or aggrieved by final agency regulatory action as described [in
Virginia Code section 2.2-4027] may seek judicial review for the
limited purpose of appealing the issue of compliance with the re-
quirements of §§ 2.2-4007.04 and 2.2-4007.1."255 Any such appeal
shall be initiated by filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule
2A:2 within one year of the date of the contested final agency ac-
tion.256
IV. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Disclosure of Jury Panel
Through Chapter 799 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly, the Gener-
al Assembly lengthened the time that lawyers will have to review
the list of potential jurors prior to trial.2 57 The legislation changes
the time period set forth in Virginia Code section 8.01-353 for the
clerk to make available to counsel a copy of the jury panel to be
used for the trial.258 Before, the clerk had been required to make
the panel list available at least forty-eight hours before trial, and
the new law increases this period to three business days.259 This
will provide counsel additional time to review the list and investi-
gate potential jurors prior to trial.
253. Id. pt. 2A, R. 2A:3 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
254. See id. R. 2A:6 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Act of Apr. 21, 2010, ch. 799, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-353 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
258. Id.
259. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-353(A) (Cum. Supp. 2009), with id. (Cum. Supp.
2010).
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B. Court Fees
Chapter 343 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly attempts to account
for the effect of inflation on certain dollar-based provisions in the
Virginia Code by increasing the amounts of certain costs, jurisdic-
tional amounts, potential attorney fee awards, and potential
damages set forth in the Code.160 The Code provisions affected are
section 6.1-118.1 (recovery of costs in actions for bad checks),2 61
section 8.01-66 (damages for loss of vehicle use),262 section 8.01-
66.2 (lien against person whose negligence causes injury),263 sec-
tion 8.01-416 (affidavit regarding damages to a vehicle),264 section
8.01-504 (penalty for service of notice of lien when no judgment
exists),26 section 8.01-682 (damages awarded appellee),266 section
15.2-1716 (reimbursement of expenses incurred responding to
DUI incidents),267 section 16.1-105 (attachments),268 section 17.1-
605 (reproducing brief and appendix),269 section 19.2-69 (civil ac-
tion for unlawful interception),27 0 section 21-186 (appeal from ac-
tion fixing fees),27 1 section 38.2-807 (attorney fees), 27 2 section 43-3
(mechanic's lien),273 section 43-24 (liens of employees, suppliers,
etc), 74 and section 46.2-364 (definitions) .275
C. Expert Witnesses-Podiatry
In response to the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Hol-
lingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., in which the court
upheld the exclusion of podiatrists as expert witnesses on the
260. Act of Apr. 10, 2010, ch. 343, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in scattered
sections of VA. CODE ANN.).
261. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-118.1 (Interim Supp. 2010).
262. Id. § 8.01-66 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
263. Id. § 8.01-66.2 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
264. Id. § 8.01-416 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
265. Id. § 8.01-504 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
266. Id. § 8.01-682 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
267. Id. § 15.2-1716 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
268. Id. § 16.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
269. Id. § 17.1-605 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
270. Id. § 19.2-69 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
271. Id. § 21-186 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
272. Id. § 38.2-807 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
273. Id. § 43-3 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
274. Id. § 43-24 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
275. Id. § 46.2-364 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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cause of a foot injury, 27 6 the General Assembly modified the Vir-
ginia Code's definition of the practice of podiatry and also added a
new Code section limiting the ability of podiatrists to testify as
expert witnesses against a doctor of medicine or osteopathic med-
icine in a malpractice proceeding.2" The definition of the practice
of podiatry, modified to specifically include the "prevention, diag-
nosis, treatment, and cure or alleviation of physical conditions,
diseases, pain, or infirmities of the human foot or ankle" effective-
ly abrogates the portion of the Hollingsworth decision which held
that a podiatrist could not testify about the cause of a foot injury
because the practice of podiatry did not include diagnosis.278 The
Act does, however, specifically provide that a podiatrist "shall not
be permitted to testify as an expert witness against" a defendant
medical doctor or osteopath in connection with any medical mal-
practice proceeding, either in court or before a medical malprac-
tice review panel.279
D. Electronic Filing
The General Assembly passed legislation in 2010 to allow elec-
tronic filing in both circuit courts and general district courts.
Chapter 760 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly amends certain exist-
ing Code provisions and adds new sections of the Code to allow
clerks to establish and operate electronic filing systems in circuit
courts. 28 0 The Act allows, inter alia, for documents to be filed in
electronic form pursuant to applicable rules of court and for an
official electronic stamp to satisfy requirements for certain court
documents needing to be stamped or affixed with a seal by the
clerk.81 The Act does, however, maintain that its provisions are
not applicable to documents specified by statutes governing the
"execution of wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, premarital
276. 279 Va. 360, 366-67, 689 S.E.2d at 654-55 (2010).
277. See Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 725, 2010 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900 (Cum. Supp. 2010); codified at id. § 8.01-401.2:1 (Cum. Supp.
2010)).
278. Id. (emphasis added); Hollingsworth, 279 Va. at 366-67, 689 S.E.2d at 654-55.
279. Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 725, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2900 (Cum. Supp. 2010); codified at id. § 8.01-401.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
280. See Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 760, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified in scattered sections
of VA. CODE ANN. tits. 16.1, 17.1 (Repl. Vol. 2010); codified at id. § 8.01-271.01 (Cum.
Supp. 2010); id. § 17.1-258.6 (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
281. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17.1-258.4(C), -258.6 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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agreements, and negotiable instruments."28 2 As to general district
courts, Chapter 622 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly provides that
such courts "shall accept case data in an electronic format for any
civil action filed."213 The use of electronic transfer is at the plain-
tiffs option and if that option is used, the party must "comply
with the security and data configuration standards established by
the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court" of
Virginia. 284 The Act also provides that if electronic transfer is
used, "the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney shall be responsible
for filing with the clerk of the general district court the paper cop-
ies of any pleading for the proper processing of such civil actions
as otherwise required by law.'215
E. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Protection
Through Chapter 350 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly, the Gener-
al Assembly clarified the law governing a number of important
issues regarding the disclosure of information protected by the at-
torney-client privilege and work product doctrine. On the topic of
"subject-matter" waiver, which has long been a fear of practition-
ers who realize during the course of discovery that a privileged
communication has been inadvertently disclosed, 286 the Act pro-
vides that when disclosure of protected information operates as a
waiver of the privilege or protection, the waiver will extend to
undisclosed communication and information only in the limited
situation where: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed
and undisclosed information concern the same subject matter;
and (3) the disclosed and undisclosed information, in fairness,
ought to be considered together2 As to inadvertent disclosure of
protected information, the Act provides that such disclosure will
not operate as a waiver if the disclosure was inadvertent, reason-
able steps were taken to prevent disclosure, and reasonable steps
282. Id. § 17.1-258.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
283. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 622, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
79.1) (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
284. § 16.1-79.1 (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
285. Id.
286. See Act of Apr. 10, 2010, ch. 350, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-420.7 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
287, § 8.01-420.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
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were taken to correct the error.2 8 The Act also addresses agree-
ments between the parties regarding disclosure of privileged in-
formation and provides that such agreements are binding only on
the parties to the agreement unless the agreement is memoria-
lized in a court order.2 89
F. Privileged Communications-Health Care
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 provides that certain com-
munications and information regarding certain medical review
committees are privileged from discovery absent a court order.290
In Chapter 196 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly, the General Assem-
bly provided that the exchange of such privileged information be-
tween "committees, boards, groups, commissions, or other enti-
ties" that function primarily to review, evaluate, and recommend
action regarding health care does not constitute a waiver of the
privilege established in the Code for such information. 29 1
G. Claims against Counties
In its 2010 session the General Assembly modified certain pro-
visions of the Code governing claims against counties. 292 The legis-
lation provides that no claim against a county can be denied un-
less the attorney representing the county has served written
notice, by certified mail, upon the complaining party or his agent
of the date on which the county's governing body will consider the
claim.2 93 The Act also sets the amount of bond or letter of credit
required to appeal a disallowed claim against a county at $250.294
Furthermore, the Act provides that the decision of a county's go-
verning body to disallow a claim is not a bar to pursuing a court
action founded on such a claim if, inter alia, the governing body
288. Id. § 8.01-420.7(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
289. Id. § 8.01-420.7(D) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
290. Id. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
291. Act of Apr. 7, 2010, ch. 196, 2010 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.17(F) (Cum. Supp. 2010)); see also § 8.01-581.16 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum.
Supp. 2010) (establishing civil immunity for members of or consultants to medical boards
or committees).
292. See Act of Apr. 12, 2010, ch. 668, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-1245 to -1247 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
293. § 15.2-1245(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
294. Id. § 15.2-1246 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
[Vol. 45:183220
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
fails to act on the claim within ninety days of the date the claim is
received by the governing body or its clerk, unless such time pe-
riod is extended by agreement between the claimant and the
county."'
H. Security for Appeals
In Chapter 494 of the Acts of Assembly, the legislature enacted
several amendments to Virginia Code section 8.01-676.1, which
governs security for appeals. 29 6 The Act enables the courts to im-
pose additional requirements on security for appeals in addition
to simply increasing the amount of security required.297 In addi-
tion, the Act provides the security can be modified for good cause
shown. 298 The Act further allows for any motion for or objection to
the modification of security for appeal to be made to the appellate
court or to the court whose decision is being appealed at any time
until the appellate court takes action on any similar motion.299
Lastly, the Act alters the practice of review of security for su-
preme court appeals by allowing such review to be conducted by
an individual justice, as opposed to a panel of justices.300
Regarding appeals of general district court decisions to the cir-
cuit court, the General Assembly amended Code section 16.1-107
to add an additional category of cases for which an indigent per-
son must post an appeal bond.30 ' As a result of this legislation, in-
digent plaintiffs who bring civil cases for "unlawful detainer
against a former owner based upon a foreclosure against that
owner" must post an appeal bond within thirty days of the date of
judgment. 302
295. Id. § 15.2-1247 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
296. See Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 494, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
297. § 8.01-676.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
298. Id. § 8.01-676.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
299. Id.
300. Id. § 8.01-676.1(Q) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
301. See Act of Apr. 8, 2010, ch. 267, 2010 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-107 (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
302. § 16.1-107 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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I. Computation of Time
The General Assembly added a new provision to Virginia Code
section 1-210, governing computation of time.303 According to the
amended statute, when an act of the General Assembly or a local
governing body, court order, or administrative regulation or order
requires an act to be performed or an action filed on a Saturday,
Sunday, legal holiday, or any day on which the state or local gov-
ernment office when the action to be performed or the action filed
is closed, the act may be performed or the action filed on the next
business day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day
on which the state or local government office where the action to
be performed or the action filed is closed.04
J. Freedom of Information Act
The General Assembly amended the provision of the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") governing enforcement pro-
ceedings to clarify that a petition to enforce FOIA rights may be
brought in the name of the person whose FOIA rights were alle-
gedly denied, notwithstanding the fact that the "request for pub-
lic records was made by the person's attorney in [a] representa-
tive capacity."05
K. Attorney-Issued Subpoenas
In amending Virginia Code section 8.01-407, governing attor-
ney issued summonses, the General Assembly eliminated the
prohibition on attorney-issued summonses with respect to pro-
ceedings for the issuance of a protective order.A06
303. Act of Mar. 9, 2010, ch. 96, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 1-210 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
304. § 1-210(E) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
305. Act of Apr. 9, 2010, ch. 299, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3713 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
306. Act of Apr. 9, 2010, ch. 302, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-407 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
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L. Judicial Emergency
Chapter 757 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly provides a procedure
under which the Supreme Court of Virginia may order the decla-
ration of a judicial emergency "when a disaster . .. substantially
endangers or impedes the operation of a court, the ability of indi-
viduals to avail themselves of the court," or the ability of litigants
to access the court to meet applicable deadlines .o7
M. Fiduciary Suits
The General Assembly added a new section to the Virginia
Code specifying the manner in which a suit by or against a fidu-
ciary must be styled and mandating the amendment of any plead-
ing filed that does not conform to the new statutory require-
ments.30 8 According to the Act, in any action that must be
prosecuted or defended by a fiduciary-"including a personal rep-
resentative, trustee, conservator, or guardian"-the style of the
case shall be set forth substantially in the following format:
"(Name of fiduciary), (type of fiduciary relationship), (Name of the
subject of the fiduciary relationship)."3 9 The Act, which was ap-
proved on April 11, 2010, states that its provisions shall apply to
any action or suit pending on the Act's effective date.310 The Act
further provides that if a pleading does not conform to its re-
quirements but otherwise identifies the proper parties, the plead-
ing must be amended on motion of any party or the court and
"[s]uch amendment relates back to the date of the original plead-
ing."311
N. Use of Commissioners in Condemnation Cases
The General Assembly amended several sections of the Virgin-
ia Code and added additional sections in order to reinstate the
ability of landowners to choose between commissioners and a jury
307. Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 957, 2010 Va. Acts -(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-
330-331 (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
308. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 437, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-6.3
(Cum. Supp. 2010)).
309. § 8.01-6.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
310. Ch. 437, 2010 Va. Acts _.
311. Id.
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to hear a condemnation case. 312 The Act also provides for equal
pay for condemnation jurors and jurors in regular cases.313 The
Act's provisions apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 2010.314
0. Disclosure of Insurance Policy Limits Prior to Wrongful Death
Claim
Chapter 435 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly provides the ability
of an attorney or personal representative of an estate of a dece-
dent who died from a motor vehicle accident to request in writing,
prior to filing a suit for wrongful death, that the insurer disclose
the limits of any motor vehicle liability insurance policy or any
personal injury liability insurance policy that may apply to the
claim.15 The party making the request must provide the insurer
with "the date of the ... accident, the name and last known ad-
dress of the alleged tortfeasor, a copy of the accident report, if
any, and the claim number, if available."3 16 The requesting party
must also provide the insurer with the decedent's death certifi-
cate, the certificate of qualification as personal representative,
the names and relationships of any statutory beneficiaries of the
decedent, medical bills supporting any claim for damages and "a
description of the source, amount, and payment history of the
claimed income loss for each beneficiary."3" The insurer must re-
spond in writing to the request within thirty days of receipt, and
disclosure of the policy limits does not constitute an admission of
liability, nor does it make the policy information admissible at
trial.3 11
312. See Act of Apr. 21, 2010, ch. 835, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of VA. CODE ANN. tits. 8.01, 25.1, 62.1 (Cum. Supp. 2010); codified at id. §§
25.1-227.1 to -227.2 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
313. § 25.1-235 (Cum. Supp. 2010); see id. § 17.1-618 (Repl. Vol. 2010) (setting forth
compensation and reimbursement amounts for jurors and jury commissioners).
314. Ch. 835, 2010 Va. Acts _.
315. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 435, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-417 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
316. § 8.01-417(C) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
317. Id. § 8.01-417(D) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
318. Id. § 8.01-417(C) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
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P. Space Flight Liability and Immunity
The General Assembly repealed a previous act creating a sun-
set for the Space Flight Immunity Act.319 The Space Flight Im-
munity Act had been set to expire on July 1, 2013.320
Q. Landlord-Tenant
By Chapter 550 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly, the legislature
modified and added certain Code provisions regarding landlord-
tenant matters. 32 1 As to issues of procedure, the Act provides, in-
ter alia, that the judgment rate of interest "shall be the judgment
rate of interest in effect at the time of entry of the judgment on
any amounts for which judgment is entered."3 22 The Act also pro-
vides that if a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action chooses to
receive a judgment for possession of the property, the judge shall,
unless requested or ruled otherwise, "hear evidence as to the is-
sue of possession on the initial court date and shall hear evidence
on the final rent and damages at the hearing set on the conti-
nuance date."3 23
R. Notice of Lien on Financial Institutions
The General Assembly amended certain provisions of the Vir-
ginia Code regarding service of notices of liens on financial insti-
tutions. 324 According to the Act, any judgment creditor who serves
notice of a lien on a financial institution must, within five busi-
ness days of service, mail a copy of the notice of lien, along with a
notice of exemptions and claim for exemption form, to the debtor
at his last known address. 325 The judgment creditor must also file
a certification with the court that the notices have been mailed to
319. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 491, 2010 Va. Acts _ (repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
227.10 note (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
320. §§ 8.01-227.8 to -227.10 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
321. See Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 550, 2010 Acts - (codified as amended in scattered
sections of VA. CODE ANN.; codified at id. § 16.1-79.1 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
322. § 6.1-330.54 (Interim Supp. 2010).
323. Id. § 8.01-128(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
324. See Act of Apr. 12, 2010, ch. 673, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-502.1, -512.4 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
325. § 8.01-502.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
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the debtor. 326 If the judgment creditor fails to comply with these
requirements, the creditor will be liable to the debtor for no more
than $100 in damages unless the creditor proves the failure to
comply was not willful."7
S. Service by Publication
Through Chapter 827 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly, the Gener-
al Assembly amended section 8.01-316 of the Virginia Code,
which governs service of process by publication. 328 Section 8.01-
316 allows publication orders in certain cases to be entered by the
clerk but provides that only the court may enter the publication
order in certain other cases. 329 Section 8.01-316 now provides that
any publication orders "not properly entered, but processed by a
clerk prior to July 1, 2010, shall be deemed to have been properly
entered."330
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Act of Apr. 21, 2010, ch. 827, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-316 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
329. See § 8.01-316(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
330. Id.
226 [Vol. 45:183
